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Abstract
We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority thresh-
old determination as a function of voters risk preferences. The experimen-
tal results conrm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between
a voters risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold.
Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voters preferred majority
threshold negatively relates to the voters condence about how others will
vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal
about othersvoting behavior, the condence-related motivation of behavior
loses ground to the signals strength.
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1 Introduction
Voting determines a large number of collective decisions. As a major expression of
the democracy of a political system, the design of voting institutions should account,
among other things, for citizens preferences regarding the threshold required in
order to determine the winning majority. In this paper, we argue that peoples
preferences for a given majority threshold depend on their attitudes towards risk as
well as other behavioral characteristics. We present both a theoretical framework and
experimental evidence that are based on this simple intuition. An agent knows that
future common decisions will be made by voting. The decisions may be favorable
or unfavorable to her, and the nal outcome is uncertain as she does not know
how others will vote. Voting becomes a lottery: there is a chance that a favorable
majority will form, but also a risk to be tyrannized by an unfavorable majority. The
expected value of this lottery crucially depends on the voting rules: for example,
less decisive voting rules, such as a high supermajority, reduce the tyranny risk but
also the chance to get a favorable outcome. Intuitively, a risk-averse agent is more
sensitive to the prospect of falling into a minority than to the chance of ending up
into a majority. We expect preference for higher supermajorities and less decisive
rules from more risk-averse agents, and vice versa.
Simple majority is less frequent in the real world, than it might be thought. Most
countries have de facto supermajority requirements because of bicameral legislatures:
it is not easy to undo the status-quo if a bill has to pass a two-house majority.
Legislation processes are often subject to executive vetoes or other forms of check and
balances. International agreements usually require unanimity (WTO), veto power
(the UN Security Council), or high supermajorities (the Council of the EU). When
corporate boards vote on major actions (mergers and acquisitions, major capital
expansions, etc.), high supermajorities are generally required. We claim that this
extensive use of supermajorities de facto reects a general aversion towards the risk
of being tyrannized. In many cases, the trade-o¤between protection and decisiveness
is solved in favor of protection.
We add a further dimension to our analysis: the agents priors about how others
will vote. The simple intuition is that when an agent thinks of herself as substantially
di¤erent from the others, then she thinks that the others are less likely to vote as her;
thus she assigns a higher probability to the event of being tyrannized. Given her risk
attitudes, she demands for stronger protection, i.e. for a higher threshold. With this
dimension, we explore how preferences for voting rules depend either on exogenous
psychological attitudes, such as subjective condence, or on the unbiaseduse of
objective information about the policy preferences of other people.
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Reality shows that those who think of themselves as di¤erent from the majority
ask for more protectionist rules. This is the case of ethnic minorities, that are usually
protected by constitutional provisions that cannot be undone by the majority. In the
EU, members may always invoke a conditional veto power when decisions concern
their crucial interests (the so-called Luxembourg compromise).
We support theoretical predictions with experimental data. We nd a positive
and signicant correlation between the majority threshold chosen by an agent and her
degree of risk aversion as measured by standard experimental techniques. Moreover,
agents preferred majority threshold is negatively and signicantly correlated with
her subjective over-condence. However, when agents can observe a private signal on
the distribution of voterspreferences over the policies to vote, we nd that preferred
majority thresholds are fully determined by the signal, rather than by their naive
priors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we relate our paper
to the existing literature on public choice. In section 3 we describe our experimental
design. Section 4 draws the main theoretical predictions to test. In section 5, we
present experimental results and section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this study, voting is modeled as a lottery where uncertainty comes from the agents
ignorance about how others will vote. Thus the risk of an unfavorable outcome can
be controlled by setting up an appropriate majority threshold.
The idea that the preferences for voting rules reect the uncertainty about the
voting outcome is not new in the literature. Rae (1969) focuses on the uncertainty
related to gains or losses generated from the making of a law. He suggests that
the bare majority is the only rule that minimizes the expected cost of being part
of the minority. This result is formally proved in Taylor (1969). In fact, Raes
result applies to voting contests in which costs and gains are equal and also equally
likely to arise from a bill that is opposed to the status quo. Attanasi et al. (2013)
extend Raes (1969) setting to a wider range of situations. The most preferred
voting rule optimizes the trade-o¤ between the risk of ending up into an unfavorable
minority and the chance to be part of the majority. Of course, risk aversion implies
stronger preference for more conservative rules. Self-protection from the risk of bad
policy decisions is the same reason why in Aghion et al. (2004) a representative
agent prefers a lower degree of insulation of political leaders. The authors do not
specically consider qualied majorities, but it is easy to see that an executive is less
insulated when a higher supermajority is required to pass laws in the Parliament.
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The optimal degree of insulation depends on the cost of compensating the losers, the
uncertainty about gains and losses, the degree of risk aversion. In Aghion and Bolton
(2003), risk derives from ex-ante ignorance about losses or gains from the provision
of a public good. In this scenario, if the expected cost of compensating the losing
minority raises, then agents prefer a higher qualied majority threshold.
We claim that an individual who is more optimistic about how the others will vote
perceives a lower risk of tyranny. As a consequence, she prefers more decisive voting
rules. This relationship between condence and preferences for voting rules is new
in the literature. So far, condence has been directly related to voting preferences
rather than to the preferences for voting rules. Seminal papers are Buchanan and
Faith (1980, 1981) and Zorn and Martin (1986).
In our experimental setting, uncertainty originates from the random assignment
of subjects favorite alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, there are no ex-
perimental works analyzing the choice of majority thresholds at the individual level
and relating them to risk aversion and condence. The experimental literature has
paid much more attention to strategic voting, as a situation that arises due to the
tension between an individual voters true preferences and the expected e¤ect of a
vote on the nal outcome. Specically, the studies by Fiorina and Plott (1978) and
Plott (1991) report experimental results supporting the notion of the core. On the
contrary, voting through truthful revelation of voterspreferences has received little,
if any, attention because of researcherslack of interest in the apparently trivial situ-
ation in which a voter simply translates her preference into an actual vote. However,
our paper shows that truthful voting may still be a fruitful area of research, in the
framework of which voterspreferences can be studied over di¤erent voting institu-
tions. A number of experimental studies have investigated into the role of majority
rules (Fiorina and Plott, 1978) and other alternatives like Borda rule, approval voting
(Forsythe et al., 1996) and unanimity (Guarnaschelli et al., 2000) on the observed
outcomes. Recently, some experiments have been conducted, such as Hortala-Vallve
(2004) and Casella et al. (2006, 2008), which explore the behavior of laboratory
committees using novel voting methods that allow members to express strength of
preference. However, in all these papers the majority rule is exogenously imposed by
the experimenter while the focus of the studies is on the voting outcomes obtained.
Therefore, the emergence of di¤erent voting institutions as the result of voterspref-
erences over them remains unexplored. Furthermore, as we argue in this paper, it
is anything but trivial to investigate some of the sources of a voters preference for
a particular majority threshold. Rather than exogenously imposing the threshold
as an invariant political institution, we consider voters with di¤erent idiosyncratic
features which may give rise to di¤erent preferences for a higher or a lower majority
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threshold in a given voting process.
Following the insights of our Expected Utility model, we relate the agents pre-
ferred majority threshold to her subjective degree of risk aversion, i.e. to the curva-
ture of her Bernoullian utility function.2We also relate the majority threshold chosen
by the agent to her belief about the distribution of votes exogenously assigned to
the other voters. Therefore, the kind of condence we are interested in is the
one that an agent shows when being asked to evaluate the probability of a random
policy outcome, that can get her a gain, a loss, or the status quo. Empirical stud-
ies in behavioral nance do not nd clear-cut evidence that over-condent investors
actually do take more risks (see e.g. Dorn and Huberman, 2005; Menkho¤ et al.,
2006). Interestingly, the experimental literature has shown that individuals seem to
be both overly optimistic about future outcomes and prone to overcondence (see
e.g. Lichtenstein et al., 1982) and that these biases can signicantly a¤ect risk taking
behavior. In our experiment, we elicit subjectscondence (uncondence) in two dif-
ferent situations. In both situations there is no strategic interaction among subjects:
each subject truthfully votes for the alternative she has been randomly assigned. In
one treatment, subjects are asked to state their beliefs about the exogenous distri-
bution of votes over two alternatives. In this treatment they only know that each
subjects vote has the same probability to be assigned to either one or the other
of the two alternatives. In another treatment, we ask subjects the same question,
after having let them observe a private signal about the votes distribution. Thus, we
can estimate the e¤ects of exit polls and pre-voting information on both subjects
beliefs and their preferred threshold. Existing literature has shown that exit polls
and pre-voting information a¤ect voting behavior (see e.g. Blais and Bodet, 2006;
McAllister and Studlar, 1991; Sudman, 1986). In this paper we check whether and,
if so, in which way, pre-voting information a¤ects the preferred threshold.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two treatments, the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment.
In the NO-INFO treatment, subjects participated in two consecutive phases. Only
one of the two phases was used to determine subjectsnal payo¤. In particular,
at the end of the session, we randomly drew the phase to pay by ipping a coin.
Instructions were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of each phase.
In the rst phase, subjects participated in a variant of the Holt and Laurys
mechanism to elicit subjectsrisk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002). Subjects were
presented with a battery of 19 pairs of lotteries numbered from (line) L1 to (line) L19
and a last (empty) line L20. Each pair described two lotteries called A and B. Each
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lottery presented two possible monetary outcomes, a favorable and an unfavorable
outcome, as well as their attached probabilities. Probabilities were framed by means
of an urn that contained twenty tickets, numbered from 1 to 20. The structure of the
battery had two main characteristics. First, within each pair, lottery A and lottery B
had the same probability structure but di¤erent monetary outcomes. In particular,
the favorable and the unfavorable outcome of lottery A were 12:00 and 10:00 euros
respectively, while they were set to 22:00 and 0:50 euros for lottery B. Second, across
pairs, while we kept constant the monetary outcomes of the corresponding lotteries,
we varied the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcomes. In particular,
while in L1 the probabilities of the favorable and unfavorable outcome where 1=20
and 19=20 respectively, they were gradually and monotonically changed across pairs
in such a way that in L19 they ended up with 19=20 and 1=20 respectively. Given
the battery, each subject was asked to choose the line (pair of lotteries) starting from
which she preferred lottery B to lottery A. Thus, for all pairs of lotteries above her
choice, a subject preferred lottery A to lottery B, while starting from the pair on
the chosen line and for all the pairs below, she preferred lottery B to lottery A. A
subject preferring lottery A to lottery B for all the 19 pairs selected the last (empty)
line L20. Participants knew that, if the rst phase of the experiment was drawn (by
ipping the coin) to determine their nal earnings, the computer would randomly
select a pair of lotteries for each participant. Given her choice and according to
the pair selected by the computer, each subject participated in the preferred lottery.
Then, an experimenter randomly drew one of the twenty tickets contained in the
urn. The ticket drawn by the experimenter was used to determine the outcome of
the preferred lottery and the corresponding payo¤ for each participant.
We will use a subjects choice in the rst phase of the experiment as a proxy
of her degree of risk aversion. Given the structure of the battery, the higher the
number of the line chosen by the subject, the higher her degree of risk aversion. Note
that, di¤erently from the original setting proposed by Holt and Laury (2002), in our
experiment we imposed consistency. Indeed, rather than o¤ering further evidence on
(in-)consistency of risk preferences, in this paper we are interested in measuring the
correlation between risk aversion and the preferred majority threshold.3
The second phase of the experiment consisted of two consecutive parts. Again, the
instructions of each decisional task were distributed and read aloud at the beginning
of each part.
In part 1 of the second phase, each subject was asked to choose a majority
threshold included between the simple majority and the unanimity, that she wanted
to apply in a voting procedure between two alternatives, X and Y . At the beginning
of the phase, the computer randomly assigned to each subject and with equal prob-
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ability one of two types, x or y. Given her type, a subjects vote was automatically
assigned by the computer to the corresponding alternative, such that x type voters
supported alternative X while y type voters supported alternative Y . Subjects were
informed that, if at the end of the experiment the second phase was drawn to be paid,
the payo¤ of each subject from part 1 was determined by comparing her preferred
majority threshold with the distribution of x type voters and y type voters in that
session. In particular, if the majority threshold stated by a subject was equal to or
smaller than the number of subjects of her own type, then she earned 22:00 euros;
while, if it was equal to or smaller than the number of subjects of the other type, she
earned nothing. Finally, if neither the number of subjects of her own type nor that
of the other type were greater than or equal to her stated majority threshold, then
the subject earned 11:00 euros.
In part 2 of the second phase, each subject was asked to guess the distribution
of x type and y type voters in that session. If at the end of the experiment the
second phase was drawn to be paid and her guess was correct, then 3:00 euros were
added to the subjects earnings from part 1 of this phase.
The only di¤erence between the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment was that
in the latter, at the beginning of the second phase, each subject privately observed
a signal about the distribution of x type and y type voters in that session. In
particular, for each subject the computer randomly and independently selected a
subset of 7 participants. Then, each subject was presented with the distribution of
x type and y type voters in the correspondent subset. After that, each subject
was asked to choose a majority threshold (part 1) and to guess the distribution of
x type and y type voters in that session (part 2), as in the NO-INFO treatment.
Overall, we run three sessions of the NO-INFO treatment and two sessions of
the INFO treatment. Each session of the NO-INFO treatment involved 31 subjects,
while each session of the INFO treatment involved 35 subjects. Each subject could
only participate in one of these sessions. The sessions were run at the EELAB,
University of Milan - Bicocca, in 2008 and at the Bocconi University, Milan, in 2009.
Each session lasted around one hour and subjects earned on average 12.59 euros
plus 3.00 euros of show-up fee. The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Theoretical Predictions
In political choices, the agent faces a certain amount of risk if she does not know how
others will vote. In this section, we present a simple theoretical model in which the
majority threshold preferred by an agent depends on her degree of risk aversion and
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her priors about how others will vote. Coherently with our experimental design, we
propose a discrete model for a smallnumber of agents, n+ 1, with n being even.4
Consider agent j. Her voting prospect can be represented as a non-degenerate
lottery in the following way. Let N = f1; :::; n; jg be the set of n+1 agents who play
a majority voting game where q is the majority threshold and agents have one vote
each. Thus the sum of votes is n + 1. Assume that the threshold must be at least
the simple majority, i.e. q 2 n
2
+ 1; :::; n+ 1
	
given the discreteness of the setting.
Let uj() be js utility function. The argument of uj is a policy outcome. Assume
that two alternative policy reforms, W and L, are opposed one to another within a
legislature. Either reform passes only if it reaches the required majority threshold.
From js perspective, W is better than the status quo, and L is worse: uj(W ) >
uj(S) > uj(L). We say that j wins if her most preferred policy alternative, W ,
reaches the required majority in voting. Agent j loseswhen this happens for the
least preferred alternative, L. The status quo S remains if no alternative reaches the
required majority threshold. In other words, agent j wins only if, in addition to her,
a coalition TW that commands at least q   1 votes forms. She loses if an adverse
coalition TL of voters who favor L collects at least q votes. We are interested in the
probability that either TW , or TL or no winning coalition form, and in how these
chances depend on the majority threshold.
Let us assume that agent j thinks that any other agent i (where i = 1; ::; n)
will cast her vote in favor of W with subjective probability p, and will vote for
L with probability (1   p).5 One may say that p captures js degree of condence
regarding how the other n agents will vote. Thus, the probabilities of winning and
losing originate from two binomial distributions with parameters (n; p) and (n; 1  p),
respectively. More precisely, the othersvotes behave as n independent Bernoulli
random variables, Z, where Z = 1 with probability p, and Z = 0 with probability
(1   p). As a consequence, js probability of winning, i.e. the probability that TW
forms, is given by the probability that the sum of those variables is at least q   1:
Pr fWg =
nX
k=q 1

n
k

pk(1  p)n k : (1)
Conversely, js subjective probability of falling into the minority (the probability
that TL forms) is
Pr fLg =
nX
k=q

n
k

(1  p)kpn k . (2)
Finally, js subjective probability that the status quo prevails (the probability that
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neither TW nor TL reach the required majority) is
Pr fSg = 1  Pr fWg   Pr fLg : (3)
Thus, from agent js viewpoint, voting can be described as a lottery with three
possible outcomes and attached subjective probabilities, as dened in (1-3); i.e. as
 = (W;Pr fWg ;L;Pr fLg ;S;Pr fSg) : Observe that all probabilities in  depend,
among other things, on the majority threshold, q. For example, with the simple
majority, Pr fSg is close to zero, whereas with unanimity, the status quo is almost
certain.
Therefore, agent js expected utility from the voting lottery
EUj() = Pr fWg  uj(W ) + Pr fLg  uj(L) + Pr fSg  uj(S) (4)
depends on the majority threshold q. Call q the threshold that maximizes EUj. Be-
low, we show that q is positively related to js degree of risk aversion, and negatively
related to her degree of condence.
For simplicity, let us normalize the status quo utility to zero. Thus, for any
majority threshold q, we can write:
EUj(q)
uj(W )
=
nX
k=q 1

n
k

pk(1  p)n k  Rj
nX
k=q

n
k

(1  p)kpn k (5)
where
Rj  uj(S)  uj(L)
uj(W )  uj(S) > 0 : (6)
From (5) it is clear that the agent balances the impact of q on the expected benet of
belonging to the majority with the impact of q on the expected loss of falling into the
minority. Call Rj in (6) the ratio between agent js benets of not being tyrannized
by an undesired majority, uj(S) uj(L), and her benets of being part of a favorable
winning majority, uj(W )   uj(S). Basically, Rj is positively related to js degree
of risk aversion, i.e. to the curvature of her utility function. In fact, all lotteries
over three xed prizes can be represented in the 2-dimensional Marschak-Machina
triangle. The slope of indi¤erence curves on this domain is exactly Rj and, indeed,
the more risk-averse agent j is, the steeper the indi¤erence curves are.6 The idea
is that, for given policy outcomes W , L and S, a more risk-averse agent weights
the advantage of avoiding the tyranny of an adverse majority (the numerator) more
than the advantage of being part of a favorable majority (the denominator). We will
come back to this point below.
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Let us call (q)  q
n+1 q

p
1 p
2q n 1
. Notice that the rst-order di¤erence of
EUj(q)
uj(W )
has the same sign of Rj  (q). Therefore,
EUj(q + 1) < EUj(q) i¤ (q) > Rj ; (7)
EUj(q + 1) > EUj(q) i¤ (q) < Rj .
According to the conditions above, we can distinguish three cases for the preferred
majority threshold q, in terms of js priors about how others will vote. The following
denition identies the three subsets of priors.
Denition 1 An agent is unbiased with respect to how others will vote if her prior
on ending up into a majority matches the probability inferred from the objective
information at her disposal. She is over-condent (uncondent) if her prior of
ending up into a majority is higher (lower) than the probability inferred from the
objective information at her disposal.
The analysis below is implemented for the NO-INFO treatment, where all sub-
jects are publicly given the following objective information about the distribution of
votes: each subject is randomly and with equal probability assigned one of two policy
alternatives. The results below can be easily extended to the INFO treatment, as it
will be discussed at the end of this section.
Case 1. Suppose that j is unbiased with respect to how others will vote. Thus, in
theNO-INFO treatment, she thinks that a favorable majority and an unfavorable one
are equally likely to form (p = 0:5). Given her vote, she thinks that her alternative
will receive n
2
+ 1 votes. In this case, (q) = q
n+1 q , increasing in q and larger than
1 for every possible thresholds q  n
2
+ 1.
Case 1.a. If Rj 2 (0; 1], then EUj(q) is decreasing in q for every possible q  n2+1
and j prefers the simple majority.
Case 1.b. If Rj 2 (1;+1), if n and Rj are su¢ ciently small, then (n2 + 1) =
1 + 2
n
> Rj, and j prefers the simple majority. If Rj is su¢ ciently large, then
(n) = n  Rj and j prefers unanimity. For intermediate R, the preferred threshold
is an internal supermajority.
Recalling that Rj is positively related to js degree of risk aversion, the following
lemma can be stated.
Lemma 1 The preferred majority threshold of an unbiased agent depends positively
on her degree of risk aversion.
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Case 2. Suppose that j is over-condent with respect to how others will vote.
Thus, in the NO-INFO treatment, she thinks that the probability of a favorable
majority is higher than an unfavorable one, i.e. p > 0:5. Given her vote, she thinks
that her alternative will always receive more than n
2
+ 1 votes. In that case, (q) is
increasing in q and it is larger than 1 for all possible q  n
2
+ 1.
Case 2.a. If Rj 2 (0; 1], given (7), the most preferred threshold is the simple
majority qs = n
2
+ 1. The interpretation of this result is trivial. The agent has two
good perspectives from voting: on the one hand, winning is always more likely; on
the other hand, losing is (weakly) less costly than winning. In this case, she wants
to increase the chance of winning by choosing the lowest possible threshold, even
though this will also increase the chance of losing.
Case 2.b. If Rj 2 (1;+1), then EUj is possibly not monotonic in q. Thus
there might be several local maxima for EUj; among them j will choose the global
one. Observe that in the simple majority (n
2
+ 1) =
 
1 + 2
n

p
1 p . Given that
p > 0:5, it is (n
2
+ 1) > 1; however, if n and Rj are su¢ ciently large such that 
1 + 2
n

p
1 p  Rj, then EUj(q) is increasing when q is the simple majority. Moreover,
(n) = n

p
1 p
n 1
. For large n, Rj < (n), then EUj decreases when q approaches
unanimity. Therefore, if n is su¢ ciently large, the rst-order di¤erence of EUj(q)
is positive in the simple majority and negative in unanimity. This implies that the
global maximum is an interior supermajority. If instead Rj  (n) then unanimity
is the preferred threshold. This means that the over-condent agent prefers either a
supermajority qS 2 n
2
+ 2; :::; n
	
, or unanimity qS = n + 1, if the gains of winning
(uj(W )   uj(S)) are lower than the gains from not losing (uj(S)   uj(L)). The
intuition is clear: j thinks that winning is more likely than losing. However, she
has little advantages in winning, compared to the disadvantage of losing. Thus, she
tends to protect herself with a supermajority. To some extent, the positive prospect
that winning is more likely than losing is mitigated by the higher cost of falling into
a minority.
The analysis in case 2, compared to the analysis in case 1, leads to the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 The preferred majority threshold of an over-condent agent depends pos-
itively on her degree of risk aversion. Moreover, for the same degree of risk aversion,
an over-condent agent prefers a lower majority threshold than the one preferred by
an unbiased agent.
Case 3. Now consider the case in which agent j is uncondent with respect
to how others will vote. Thus, in the NO-INFO treatment, she thinks that the
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probability of a favorable majority is lower than an unfavorable one, i.e. p < 0:5.
Despite her vote, she thinks that her alternative will always receive less than n
2
+ 1
votes. In that case, (q) is smaller than 1 for all possible q  n
2
+ 1.
Case 3.a. If Rj 2 (0; 1), we can examine the shape of EUj(q) by studying the sign
of (q) (q+1). If it is positive then possibly (q) > Rj holds for low thresholds
and (q) < Rj holds for high thresholds; i.e. EUj(q) is convex. Of course, this is
not always the case. Observe, however that
(q) (q + 1) =

p
1  p
2q n "
q
n  q  
q + 1
n  q   1

p
1  p
2#
:
In the right-hand side the rst term is positive. The second term is decreasing in p
and increasing in q.
If p is high, then (q) is high and increasing in q for every q  n
2
+ 1. Thus, if
R! 0+, then (q) > Rj for every q and the most preferred threshold is the simple
majority. As R increases, it is (q) < Rj for low q and (q) > Rj for high q and
the most preferred threshold is an internal supermajority.
If p is low, then (q) is low and decreasing in q for every q  n
2
+ 1. Thus, if
R ! 1 , it is (q) < Rj for every q and the most preferred threshold is unanimity.
As R decreases, it is (q) > Rj for low q and (q) < Rj for high q and the
most preferred threshold can be unanimity or simple majority depending on the
comparison between EUj(n) and EUj(n2 + 1). In particular, the more R decreases,
the more likely that simple majority is preferred to unanimity.7
For intermediate p, then (q) is decreasing in q for low q, and is increasing in q
for high q. For R ! 0+ and R ! 1  the preferred threshold is the simple majority
and unanimity respectively. For intermediate R, given that (q) is convex, EUj is
possibly not monotonic in q. Thus there might be several local maxima for EUj;
among them j will choose the global one. In that case, the most preferred threshold
can be simple majority, an internal supermajority or unanimity, depending on p and
on R. Therefore, for intermediate values of R, an uncondent agent could prefer
a simple majority if p is not too low, i.e. if the ratio between winning and losing
probabilities under the simple majority is higher than the relative advantage of the
status quo. For lower p, she prefers to protect herself against the tyranny of an
adverse majority through a supermajority threshold. Notice that if the expected loss
of falling into the minority is at least equal to the the expected benet of belonging
to the majority, an uncondent agent prefers unanimity as threshold whatever her
p < 0:5.
Case 3.b. If Rj 2 [1;+1), given (7), the most preferred threshold is unanimity.
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The intuition is clear: for an uncondent agent, winning is always less likely than
losing; moreover, a Rj greater than one implies that losing is relatively more costly
than winning. The voting lottery presents a double disadvantage: tyranny is highly
likely and highly costly. This is the worst situation; thus, not surprisingly, the
agent prefers the highest protection from the risk of being tyrannized. This kind of
protection is provided by unanimity.
The analysis in case 3, compared to the analysis in case 1, leads to the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 The preferred majority threshold of an uncondent agent depends posi-
tively on her degree of risk aversion. Moreover, for the same degree of risk aversion,
an uncondent agent prefers a higher majority threshold than the one preferred by
an unbiased agent.
Considering together the three lemmas above, a general result can be stated about
the relation between an agents preferred majority threshold and her degree of risk
aversion, and between the former and the agents condence about how the other
agents will vote. This result is formally presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the voting lottery , an agents preferred majority threshold de-
pends positively on her degree of risk aversion and negatively on her condence about
how the other agents will vote.
Proposition 1 provides the two main theoretical predictions that we want to test
on subjectsdecisions in our experiment.
First, once elicited the subjects degree of risk aversion in the rst phase of the
experiment, we expect to nd that the higher the subjects degree of risk aversion,
the higher the majority threshold she would select in part 1 of the second phase of
the experiment. In fact, a risk-averse subject weights the sure payo¤ in the status
quo more than the uncertain payo¤ of the voting. Thus, the higher her degree of risk
aversion, the stronger the protection demanded, the higher her preferred majority
threshold.
Proposition 1 also provides a prediction about the role of the subjects degree of
condence about how the other subjects will vote (elicited in part 2 of the second
phase of the experiment). In this case, the intuition provided by the theoretical
model is straightforward. Higher condence means that the subject considers win-
ning relatively more likely; thus, other things being equal, she fears losing less and
prefers lower protection. In this case, she wants to facilitate majority formation,
because, for any majority threshold, a favorable majority has become more likely;
13
thus, she wants a lower threshold. We test the negative e¤ect of subjectscondence
on the preferred majority thresholds in two di¤erent settings. In the rst treatment
(NO-INFO), we measure condence by simply asking subjects to state their naive
priors about the distribution of othersvotes over the two alternatives. In this treat-
ment, the only information available to subjects is about the process of random draw
of votes, but they know nothing about the realizations of these draws for the other
subjects in the session. In the second treatment (INFO), we study how the e¤ects
of condence change when subjects, before stating their preferred majority thresh-
olds, privately observe a signal about these realizations, i.e. about the (exogenous)
distribution of votes over policies.
A nal theoretical prediction to be validated concerns the independency of the
e¤ect of risk aversion and of condence on the preferred threshold (this is assumed in
our model). Our model predicts that given two subjects with the same prior, the one
with the lowest degree of risk aversion should select the lowest majority threshold.
Moreover, if an over-condent subject and an uncondent subject have the same
degree of risk aversion, the preferred threshold of the former cannot be higher than
the preferred threshold of the latter.
All theoretical predictions above will be directly veried through an analysis of the
determinants of a subjects preferred majority threshold in the NO-INFO treatment.
The INFO treatment has been introduced with the goal of extending our analysis
to the case where an informative signal is sent to a subject before she declares her
preferred majority threshold. This can be interpreted as a robustness test of our
theoretical model.
Indeed, although an explicit theoretical analysis of the INFO treatment is not
provided in this section, it is easy to predict that, under the assumption of indepen-
dence between risk attitude and condence on how the others will vote, a positive
dependence of the preferred majority threshold on the subjects degree of risk aver-
sion should be found also in the INFO treatment.
Moreover, as in the NO-INFO treatment, the subjects preferred majority thresh-
old in the INFO treatment should depend negatively on her degree of condence.
However, here the generalization of Proposition 1 is anything but trivial, since the de-
nition itself of condence provided above (Denition 1) should account for a variety
of private signals.
In the NO-INFO treatment, each subject only possesses the same ex-ante infor-
mation about the random process determining the other voterstypes: each subject
has the same objective probability of being a x type or a y type voter. Hence, ac-
cording to Denition 1, an unbiased subject should report that both types of voters
are equally likely among other subjects. Indeed, this is also the modal outcome of
14
the binomial distribution over types of voters.
Although this ex-ante information is provided also in the INFO treatment, here
each subject receives an additional private signal, and none of the private signals she
may receive entails equiprobable types.8 As the latter signal conveys information on
the realizations of the random process,9 our behavioral assumption is that a subject
totally adapts her beliefs to the ex-post private signal rather than to the ex-ante
information about the underlying distribution of voters in the whole population.
Therefore, we take the private signal as reference point for measuring condence
in the INFO treatment. According to Denition 1, we dene as unbiased in this
treatment a subject who rescales the distribution of types in the signal she privately
received to the size of the subject pool. Then, an index of condence is dened
as the di¤erence between the number of voters a subject expects to have her own
type and the predicted number obtained by rescaling the private signal she received.
For an over-condent (uncondent) subject the sign of the index of condence is
positive (negative). The behavioral assumption on the dominance of the private
over the public signal in the INFO treatment is tested by comparing the percentage
of unbiased subjects in the NO-INFO and in the INFO treatment. A signicantly
higher percentage of such subjects in the latter treatment would provide support to a
prevalent role of the private signal in determining a subjects prior about how others
will vote. If this is the case, then we expect the private signal to have a signicant
e¤ect over the preferred majority threshold in the INFO treatment.
Notice that our strict denition of unbiasedness in the INFO treatment requires
that subjects use their private information from 7 observations to form their beliefs
on the larger sample of 35. Thus, deviations from the resulting linear extrapolation
are considered biased, even if they could be the result of a more sophisticated use of
statistics.10 Thus, our denition might lead to an overestimation of biased subjects
(although in the next section we show that an opposite result applies). At the same
time, it is the most objective and straightforward way of determining an unbiased
guess.
Lastly, the role of the private signal over the preferred majority threshold in the
INFO treatment requires a thorough discussion. The percentage of votes disclosed
through the private signal (20%) is non-negligible with the respect to the whole
population of voters. Hence, di¤erent private signals might lead to di¤erent preferred
thresholds (also) because their realization inuences the number of favorable votes
needed  in the remaining part of the population  to form a majority given the
preferred threshold. We discuss this point in Appendix B, through an extension
of the theoretical model provided in this section. In particular, we show that the
theoretical predictions in Proposition 1 hold also in the extended version of the model.
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We also show that, ceteris paribus, the preferred majority threshold is non-increasing
in the number of favorable votes contained in the signal. This can be interpreted as
further theoretical support for the importance of the private signal in determining
the preferred majority threshold in our voting lottery.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Risk Attitude
Table 1 reports the distribution of subjectschoices in the rst phase of the experi-
ment in both treatments.
In the NO-INFO treatment, more than 78% of subjects choose a pair of lotteries
included between the 11th and the 20th line, thereby showing risk aversion. The
median choice is the 16th line (revealing a high degree of risk aversion).11 Similarly
to the NO-INFO treatment, in the INFO treatment the median choice is the 16th
line. More than 84% of subjects exhibit risk aversion.
Thus, as in other experiments, we observe the majority of subjects exhibiting
risk aversion, and among these many are highly-risk-averse.12 In addition, we do
not nd any signicant di¤erence between treatments in the distribution of the risk
parameter (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0:607). Therefore, subjects
samples in the two treatments are comparable in terms of risk attitudes.
[Table 1 about here]
5.2 Guess about Distribution of Voters
Moving to the second phase of the experiment, we start from analyzing subjects
guesses about the distribution between x type and y type voters.13
In the NO-INFO treatment, both types have the same objective probability in
each draw and the random draws of the type are independent for all subjects. As
anticipated in section 4, according to Denition 1 a subject with unbiased expecta-
tions about the distribution of voters should expect the rest of the population to be
equally split over the two alternatives (modal, average and median voting outcome).
Thus, knowing her type, she should expect the probability of winning to be moder-
ately higher than the probability of losing (n=2+1 subjects in her session, including
herself, should be of her type). An over-condent subject should state a distribution
of the other subjectsvotes that is biased in favour of her type. Such subject would
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expect that more than n=2 + 1 subjects in her session, including herself, are of her
type. Conversely, an uncondent subject should state a distribution of the other
subjectsvotes that is biased in favour of the other type. Such subject would expect
that less than n=2 + 1 subjects in her session, including herself, are of her type.
Therefore, Denition 1 allows to split the subjects in theNO-INFO treatment into
three subsets unbiased, over-condent and uncondent ones according to their
guess in the second phase of the experiment. We built for each subject an index
of condence dened as the di¤erence between the number of voters she expects to
have her own type and n=2+ 1. This index is negative for uncondent subjects, null
for unbiased subjects, and positive for over-condent ones. The distribution of the
index of condence is shown in Figure 1.
Observe that the modal guess is unbiased (12% of subjects report a guess equal
to n=2 + 1), whereas around 58% of subjects exhibit over-condence. A binomial
test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of equal distribution between over-condent
and uncondent subjects (p-value < 0:01). According to a Spearman correlation
test, we nd no signicant correlation between a subjects risk attitude (as proxied
by the subjects choice in the rst phase) and her condence on how other subjects
will vote. This holds both by considering the index of condence introduced above
( = 0:082, p-value = 0:432) and by using a dummy variable that assumes value one
if the subject is over-condent ( = 0:090, p-value = 0:389). Therefore, the main
assumption of our theoretical model independence between a subjects degree of
risk aversion and her level of condence is veried in the NO-INFO treatment.
[Figure 1 about here]
Result 1. In the NO-INFO treatment, the majority of subjects exhibit risk aversion
and report over-condent guesses. There is not signicant correlation between
the degree of risk aversion and condence.
The following analysis is dedicated to subjectsguesses in the INFO treatment.
Recall that in this treatment, before choosing the majority threshold and stating her
guess, each subject observed the distribution of x type and y type voters in a subset
of seven subjects. Again relying on Denition 1, in order to disentangle unbiased,
over-condent and uncondent subjects in the INFO treatment, we combine subjects
stated guesses with the informative content of their private signal. For an unbiased
subject the private signal she receives crowds out her naive prior, whatever this prior
is. Therefore, she reports as guess about the number of x type and y type voters in
her session the distribution inferred from the subset of seven subjects she observed.
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More specically, for each subject in the INFO treatment, we built a theoretical
distribution by rescaling the number of x type and y type voters in the private
signal to the size of the subject pool. Then, we built an index of condence dened
as the di¤erence between the number of voters a subject expects to have her own type
and the predicted number obtained by rescaling the private signal she received. If this
di¤erence is null, than the subject is classied as unbiased in the INFO treatment.
Consequently, if this di¤erence is positive (negative), the subject is classied as over-
condent (uncondent) in the INFO treatment. Figure 2 reports the distribution of
the index of condence in the INFO treatment.
[Figure 2 about here]
As shown by the graph, 36% of subjects reported unbiased guesses, a percentage
that is signicantly higher than in the NO-INFO treatment (p-value < 0:001 accord-
ing to a test for the null hypothesis of equality of proportions of unbiased guesses
between treatments). This result supports our behavioral assumption of relevance of
the private signal in determining a subjects prior about how others will vote in the
INFO treatment.
However, the group of subjects exhibiting over-condence (41%) is still the most
numerous in the sample. One can think that this may depend on the signal observed.
The set of signals that subjects observe in the INFO treatment can be divided in two
groups: favorable and unfavorable ones. On a subset of seven subjects, a favorable
signal reveals at least four votes of the same type as the subject receiving the signal.
An unfavorable signal shows only three or less votes of the same type as the subject
receiving the signal.
In Table 2, we report the reactions in terms of stated condence by subjects in
the INFO treatment, disentangled by the sign of the signal (positive if favorable and
negative otherwise). We controlled for the sign of the signal: the population is equally
split between those observing a favorable signal and those receiving an unfavorable
one. Despite that, a binomial test rejects the null hypothesis of an equal distribution
between over-condent and uncondent subjects (p-value = 0:072). Recall that in
this treatment an unbiased subject should rescale the distribution of types in the
signal she privately received to the size of the subject pool. Therefore, if she receives
a favorable (unfavorable) signal she should report a guess on the number of voters
of her type greater (smaller) than n=2+ 1, exactly equal to ve times the number of
votes observed in the signal.14
By considering only subjects observing an unfavorable signal, there is a clear ten-
dency towards over-condence (20 subjects out of 35 report over-condent guesses,
while only 3 report uncondent guesses), conrming the tendency in the NO-INFO
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treatment. Interestingly, a di¤erent picture emerges when we focus on those ob-
serving a favorable signal. In this case, the proportion of over-condent subjects is
slightly smaller than both the unbiased and the uncondent ones (9 vs 13): most
subjects receiving a favorable signal either believe this signal or interpret it as too
positive. However, the proportion of unbiased subjects is almost the same that we
nd when the signal is unfavorable.
[Table 2 about here]
We have an intuitive interpretation for this evidence. Suppose that, when asked
to state her prior without observing any private signal, a subject is genuinely over-
condent (i.e. over-condent according to the index dened for NO-INFO). If we
let this subject observe a favorable private signal, then she nds conrmation of her
over-condence and shows herself as unbiased with respect to the signal (i.e., accord-
ing to the index dened for INFO). If instead she observes an unfavorable signal,
her genuine over-condence prevails. Although the opposite happens for genuinely
uncondent subjects, this e¤ect is less evident, given the relative small number of
these subjects.
Furthermore, similarly to the NO-INFO treatment, condence is not signicantly
correlated to risk aversion. This is true both if we consider the index of condence
introduced for the INFO treatment ( = 0:122, p-value = 0:315) and by using a
dummy variable with value one when a subject exhibits over-condence ( = 0:164,
p-value = 0:279). Thus, the assumption of independence between a subjects degree
of risk aversion and her level of condence is also veried in the INFO treatment.
Result 2. Result 1 holds in the INFO treatment, although the number of over-
condent subjects is signicantly lower. In particular, more than one third
of subjects reports a guess about the otherstypes that is unbiased with respect
to the private signal. However, a slightly larger proportion of subjects exhibit
over-condence with respect to the private signal.
5.3 Preferred Majority Threshold
This section presents and discusses the preferred majority thresholds in the two treat-
ments. Table 3 reports the distribution of subjectschoices about thresholds in the
second phase of the experiment in the NO-INFO and INFO treatment respectively.
Notice that, due to the di¤erent number of subjects in NO-INFO sessions (31 in
each of the three sessions) and INFO sessions (35 in each of the two sessions), the
set of possible majority thresholds slightly di¤er between the two treatments: it is
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f16; 17; :::; 31g in NO-INFO and f18; 19; :::; 35g in INFO. In order to provide a visual
comparison of the distributions of majority thresholds in the two treatments, Table
3 reports them as fraction of required votes over the total number of voters. In
particular, normalized supermajority thresholds q=n 2 (50%; 100%) are grouped
in ve di¤erent intervals of similar size. The remaining two categories are the simple
majority and unanimity.
In the NO-INFO treatment, the median preferred threshold is around 77% (24
votes over 31). In the INFO treatment it is slightly lower, around 74% (26 votes
over 35). In both treatments, the modal threshold is unanimity. In the NO-INFO
treatment, simple majority is the second most preferred threshold. However, by
comparing the observed distributions of normalized majority thresholds in the two
treatments through a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the two distributions are di¤erent (p-value = 0:400).
[Table 3 about here]
Before moving to the discussion of the determinants of a subjects preferred ma-
jority threshold in the two treatments, it is worth controlling whether there has been
a hedging e¤ect across part 1 and part 2 of the second phase. Indeed, given the
preferred majority threshold (part 1), a subject might state a guess against this
threshold (part 2) so as to have a positive probability to get this guess paid in the
case an unfavorable majority would emerge given this threshold. In Table C.1 in
Appendix C, we report for each treatment separately and by considering the same
intervals of normalizedmajority thresholds used in Table 3 the number of sub-
jects stating a guess against the preferred threshold and the number of subjects
stating a guess such that the preferred threshold protects them against the possibility
of falling into a minority. In the former category, we include all subjects reporting
in part 2 a guess of the number of unfavorable votes higher than or equal to the
majority threshold chosen in part 1. In the latter category, we report the remaining
subjects. A two-sample binomial test (two-tailed) shows that, in each treatment, the
number of subjects stating a guess againstthe preferred threshold is negligible in
the whole sample (5/93 in the NO-INFO treatment, 7/70 in the INFO treatment,
p-value = 0:000 in both treatments). In the NO-INFO treatment, it is negligible
in each interval of preferred majority thresholds used in Table 3, while in the INFO
treatment it is negligible in all but two of these intervals (with p-value = 0:157 and
p-value = 0:103 in these two intervals, respectively).
Given the absence of a hedging e¤ect in a subjects guess of about how others will
vote, we consider (also) this variable in the following discussion, which focuses on the
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determinants of a subjects preferred majority threshold. The analysis under the NO-
INFO treatment provides a direct test of our theoretical predictions. Comparative
analysis under the INFO treatment provides a robustness test of our theoretical
model when an informative signal potentially inuencing a subjects prior about
the voting outcome is sent to a subject before she declares her preferred majority
threshold. Table 4 reports the results of these analyses.
[Table 4 about here]
The rst column of Table 4 reports results from a Tobit model in which the chosen
majority thresholds in the NO-INFO treatment are regressed on individual degrees of
risk aversion and two dummies for the guesses, one for Unbiasedness and the other
for Over-condence. The majority thresholds are positively and highly correlated
with subjectsdegree of risk aversion (the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is
0:499 and it is signicant at the 1% level). This result is conrmed by non-parametric
tests. Indeed, according to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, the majority thresholds
chosen by subjects exhibiting risk aversion are signicantly higher than those chosen
by risk-loving subjects (p-value = 0:012). As for the guesses about how others will
vote, the coe¢ cients of both dummies are negative and only the one reecting Over-
condence is highly signicant.
Thus, after controlling for the degree of risk aversion, over-condent subjects
choose majority thresholds that are signicantly lower than the thresholds chosen
by the uncondent ones. This evidence and the non-signicant correlation between
condence and risk aversion discussed above support the theoretical insights of our
model. In fact under the assumption that risk aversion and condence are indepen-
dent idiosyncratic features the theoretical model predicts that an over-condent
subject with a given degree of risk aversion will never choose a higher threshold than
an uncondent one with same degree of risk aversion.
Result 3. In the NO-INFO treatment, subjects prefer supermajority thresholds. Sub-
jects preferences strongly depend on specic idiosyncratic features: majority
thresholds are positively correlated with risk aversion and negatively correlated
with condence.
In the second column of Table 4, we present results from a Tobit model that
regresses the majority thresholds chosen by subjects in the INFO treatment on the
same set of explanatory variables used for the NO-INFO treatment and on Net
Favorable Signal. This variable is dened, given the signal that a subject receives,
as the di¤erence between the number of voters of her own type and the number
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of voters of the other type in her observed subset of seven subjects. As before, the
estimated coe¢ cient of Risk Aversion is positive and highly signicant. Interestingly,
neither Over-Condence nor Unbiasedness are signicant, while Net Favorable Signal
is highly signicant. Thus, the private signal tends to replace (or at least has a
stronger impact than) subjects over-condence in determining the preferred majority
threshold. Indeed, the private signal in the INFO treatment has a signicant negative
impact on the preferred majority threshold, as Over-Condence in the NO-INFO
treatment.
Result 4 In the INFO treatment, subjects prefer supermajority thresholds. There is
a positive and highly signicant correlation between a subjects preferred ma-
jority threshold and her degree of risk aversion. A favorable private signal has
a signicant negative e¤ect on the preferred threshold: the (over-)condence
determinant of a subjects preferred majority threshold loses ground in the pres-
ence of a favorable private signal.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the fear of being subject to a majority tyranny leads
an individual to prefer higher majority thresholds. In accordance to the theoretical
prediction, our experimental results show that the level of the preferred majority
threshold depends on the voters risk aversion and on subjective priors about how
others will vote. Therefore, a more risk-averse and a less condent agent may fear
more being tyrannized by an unfavorable majority, thus asking for higher superma-
jorities.
First of all, these ndings have important implications for the design of the opti-
mal voting system, which have been neglected by the literature so far.15 As a major
expression of a systems democracy, the design of voting institutions should account,
among other things, for citizenspreferences regarding the threshold required in order
to determine the winning majority.
It is also worth observing that, while risk aversion is intrinsically related to an
individuals perception of private gains and losses, lack of condence reects an
individuals perception about how own preferences may di¤er from the others. Lack
of condence may be caused by the feeling of being di¤erent in ideology, needs,
desires, vision of the world. This is particularly important in collective situations,
such as voting. An uncondent individual may think that the majority is di¤erent
from herself and consequently she does not want the majority to easily make decisions
that will a¤ect her. Thus, over-condence is a behavioral distortion that possibly
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a¤ects a voters preferences on the threshold. In fact, we nd that naively over-
condent individuals signicantly prefer lower thresholds. As soon as agents receive
a private signal according to which others are more likely to vote in a favorable way,
naive over-condence is replaced by the signal. Thus, the preferred thresholds are
fully determined by the signal, rather than by votersnaive priors. Our ndings are
in line with the existing literature on the role of exit polls and pre-voting information
on agentschoice. However, while previous experimental works focus on the role of
exit polls on voting behavior, our paper sheds light on their relevance for agents
preferences on the voting rules.
Of course, protection comes at the cost of lower chance to overcome the status
quo in a favorable way. One might argue that this individual trade-o¤ between risk
of tyranny and chance of being part of a favorable majority reects the trade-o¤ at
collective level between decisiveness of the voting rules and the need of protecting
minorities. In this paper we have not answered the question of which threshold will
be chosen at the constitutional level, and whether it is socially optimal or not.
We think, however, that our ndings contribute to answering important normative
issues such as: How voting rules reect the risk attitudes of citizens? What kind of
protection do agents demand when they belong to an ethnic minority or when they
think that their policy preferences are di¤erent from the bulk of the population?
What degree of conict on decisional rules should we expect within a constituency
whose members have diversied preferences? How many supermajority thresholds
should a statute include, and for which issues?
Finally, from a purely experimental point of view, our paper provides a method-
ological contribution to the literature on risk aversion elicitation. Indeed, our ndings
relate to the previous literature about how a specic risk-aversion measurement in
the laboratory correlates with behavior in other risk-related tasks within the same
experiment.
As has been pointed out recently, by García-Gallego et al. (2012) and Crosetto
and Filippin (2013), the external validity of risk elicitation tasks has very rarely been
addressed. For example, in very few occasions16 a risk elicitation procedure has been
useful to explain the behavior in a strategic context through subjects externally
elicited risk attitudes. In that sense, although the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure
has been adopted more frequently than other tasks as a risk elicitation device, there
is still no conclusive evidence on whether the test reasonably predicts the behavior of
a subject in a di¤erent, even risk-related task. Exceptionally, Crosetto and Filippin
(2013) compared their Bomb Risk Elicitation Task with three alternative risk elici-
tation procedures17 nding signicant di¤erences in the results and the classication
of subjects emerging from these four procedures. Yet, although a negative answer
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seems to be implied, the question whether risk attitudes correlate across tests was
not explicitly addressed. Therefore, the results presented in our paper also contribute
with a clear positive nding concerning the correlation of risk attitudes across di¤er-
ent tasks which becomes even more interesting if we take into account that the Holt
and Laury (2002) procedure and our threshold-setting experiment adopt two very
di¤erent framings.
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votes of the same type as the subject receiving the signal. An unfavorable signal
shows only three or less votes of the same type as the subject receiving the signal.
9The private signal reveals 20% of the realizations of the random draws of sub-
jectstypes.
10For example, using a Chi-Squared test one can build condence bands around
the unbiased expected guess accounting for the fact that a 3-4sample and a 18-17
guess are both not signicantly di¤erent from the 50%-50% theoretical expectation
based on the binomial distribution. Also, a more sophisticated subject would form
a guess, keeping the 7-observation signal and applying the binomial distribution to
the remaining 28 observations. Again, intervals should be used to dene signicantly
biased guesses.
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11See Holt and Laury (2002).
12See Carlsson et al. (2002) and Harrison and Rutström (2008).
13In designing the guessing task, we have followed an existing economic litera-
ture that implements similar experimental settings to study and measure subjects
optimism (see, for instance, Muren 2012).
14Di¤erently from the NO-INFO treatment, where all unbiased subjects must
report a probability of winning slightly higher than the probability of losing (i.e.
(n=2 + 1) =n), here an unbiased subject may report a probability of winning lower
than the probability of losing. This happens when she has received an unfavorable
signal.
15With one notable exception by Procaccia and Segal (2003) analyzing how a con-
stitution is drafted by people that behave according to Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
16See for example, Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002) and Charness and
Villeval (2009) on the connection between risk taking and cooperation or Heinemann
et al. (2009) on uncertainty and coordination.
17The procedures introduced in Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Grossman
(2002) and Gneezy and Potters (1997).
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Appendix A. Tables and Figures
Table 1. Distribution of Risk Preferences
Category NO-INFO INFO
r   2:863 L1 0:01 0:01
L2 0:00 0:00
L3 0:00 0:00
L4 0.01 0:01
L5 0:00 0:00
L6 0:03 0:00
L7 0:00 0:01
L8 0:02 0:03
L9 0:05 0:01
 0:112  r  0:038 L10 0:09 0:07
L11 0:02 0:13
L12 0:01 0:01
L13 0:05 0:06
L14 0:05 0:03
L15 0:11 0:13
L16 0:21 0:20
L17 0:14 0:12
L18 0:06 0:03
L19 0:09 0:08
r  1:613 L20 0:05 0:07
Note. This table reports the distribution of subjects risk preferences in
NO-INFO and INFO. For a given choice, r refers to the estimated interval
of the risk aversion parameter as obtained by using a CRRA utility function.
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Table 2. Over-Condent, Unbiased and Uncondent subjects in INFO.
Sign of Signal
Index of Condence > 0 < 0 N
> 0 9 20 29
= 0 13 12 25
< 0 13 3 16
N 35 35 70
p-valuea 0:175 0:000 0:000
p-valueb 0:523 0:000 0:072
Note. This table reports the distribution of over-condent, unbiased and uncondent subjects
in the INFO treatment, cross-tabulated with the information contained in their signals. The
table also reports results from a binomial test for the null hypothesis of an equal distribution
between condent and uncondent subjects either by including (a) or by excluding (b) from
the rst category those reporting unbiased guesses.
Table 3. Distribution of Majority Thresholds
Majority Threshold NO-INFO INFO
(q=n) = 50% 0.09 0.13
(q=n) 2 (50%; 60%) 0.08 0.10
(q=n) 2 [60%; 70%) 0.10 0.16
(q=n) 2 [70%; 80%) 0.27 0.20
(q=n) 2 [80%; 90%) 0.21 0.16
(q=n) 2 [90%; 100%) 0.07 0.08
(q=n) = 100% 0.18 0.17
Note. This table reports the distribution of the majority thresholds chosen
by subjects in part 1 of the second phase of NO-INFO and INFO.
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Table 4. Tobit Models in NO-INFO and INFO.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Majority Threshold
Explanatory Variables:
Risk Aversion 0:499 1:027
(0:164) (0:218)
Unbiasedness  2:409  1:522
(3:014) (1:971)
Over-Condence  2:742  1:183
(1:313) (1:894)
Net Favorable Signal  0:803
(0:356)
Constant 19:185 13:132
(2:555) (3:416)
N. Obs. 93 70
Log-pseudolikelihood  242:946  182:396
F-test 4:38 6:96
Prob>F 0:006 0:000
Note. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates (robust standard errors in
parentheses) from Tobit models for both the NO-INFO and INFO treat-
ment. The dependent variable is given by the majority thresholds chosen
by subjects in part 1 of the second phase of the experiment. Risk Aversion
is given by subjects choices in the rst phase of the experiment. Unbi-
asedness and Over-Condence are dummies assuming value one if, in part
2 of the second phase of the experiment, a subject reported unbiased or
over-condent guesses respectively. For a given signal received by a subject
in the second phase of the INFO treatment, Net Favorable Signal is the
di¤erence between the number of voters of her own type and the number of
voters of the other type in her observed subset of seven subjects. *, ** and
*** denote statistical signicance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Appendix B. Extension of the Theoretical Model
Dene with f the number of favorable votes in the private signal, with f 2 f0; 1; :::; fg,
where f is the size of the signal, and so the highest possible number of favorable (or
unfavorable) votes. Notice that f is xed and set to 0 (NO-INFO) or 7 (INFO) in
our experiment. By construction, it is f < n
2
+ 1, so that, regardless of the outcome
f of the signal and the majority threshold q, the agent is left with some uncertainty
about the probability of winning (losing) the voting lottery.
We can rewrite the probability of winning the voting lottery in (1) as
Pr fWg =
n+1  fX
k=q f

n+ 1  f
k

pk(1  p)n+1  f k
where also js vote has to be taken into account, given that it can be randomly
included in the signal.
Accordingly, the probability of losing the voting lottery in (2) becomes
Pr fLg =
n+1  fX
k=q ( f f)

n+ 1  f
k

(1  p)kpn+1  f k :
Notice that Pr fWg is increasing in f , while Pr fLg is decreasing in f . Indeed, given
the threshold q, the minimum number of favorable (unfavorable) votes needed to
form the majority (fall into the minority) is decreasing (increasing) in the number of
favorable votes in the signal.
By plugging the extended formulas of Pr fWg and Pr fLg into (4), we obtain
agent js normalized expected utility from the voting lottery after having received a
private signal of size f containing f favorable votes:
EUj(q)
uj(W )
=
n+1  fX
k=q f

n+ 1  f
k

pk(1 p)n+1  f k Rj
n+1  fX
k=q  f+f

n+ 1  f
k

(1 p)kpn+1  f k
(8)
where Rj is as in (6).
Then, the rst-order di¤erence of EUj(q)
uj(W )
in (8) has the same sign of Rj  (qf ),
where
(qf )  (q  
f + f)!(n+ 1  q   f)!
(q   f)!(n+ 1  q   f + f)!

p
1  p
2q n 1
:
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Four remarks about the expression of (qf ) are worth introducing.
Remark 1. Regardless of the size f of the signal, if the di¤erence between the
number of favorable votes and the number of unfavorable ones is equal to 1, then
(qf ) reduces to (q), as dened in the basic version of the model presented in the
main text.
Remark 2. (qf ) is increasing in f . In fact, the rst-order di¤erence of (qf )
with respect to f has the same sign of
[q + f   ( f   1)](q   f)  [q + f   (n+ 1)][q   f   (n+ 1  f)] ;
which is positive for every triple (q; f; f), given that f < n
2
+ 1 by construction.
Hence, the higher f , the smaller the di¤erence Rj  (qf ).
Remark 3. The rst-order di¤erence of the ratio (q 
f+f)!(n+1 q f)!
(q f)!(n+1 q  f+f)! with respect
to q in (qf ) has the same sign of
(q + 1  f + f)(n+ 1  q   f + f)  (n+ 1  q   f)(q + 1  f) ;
which is positive i¤ the signal is favorable, i.e. f  f
2
+ 1, and negative otherwise.
Remark 4. Given that q  n
2
+ 1 by construction, if the signal is favorable, then
the ratio (q 
f+f)!(n+1 q f)!
(q f)!(n+1 q  f+f)! is greater (smaller) than 1.
Extension of Case 1 in the main text. Suppose that the agent is unbiased with
respect to the private signal she receives. Hence (see Denition 1 in the main text),
if the signal is favorable (f  f
2
+ 1), then p = ff  0:5 and, by Remarks 3 and 4,
(qf ) is increasing in q and greater than 1 for every possible threshold q  n2 + 1.
If instead the signal is unfavorable (f <
f
2
+ 1), then p = ff < 0:5 and, by Remarks
3 and 4, (qf ) is decreasing in q and smaller than 1 for every possible threshold
q  n
2
+ 1.
Consider two signals f
0
< f
00
. Then, by Remark 2, it is always (qf 0 ) < (qf 00 )
and, for any Rj, it is Rj  (qf 0 ) > Rj  (qf 00 ).
Case 1f (favorable). The two signals are favorable, i.e.
f
2
+ 1  f 0 < f 00.
Case 1f.a. If Rj 2 (0; 1], it is 0 > Rj  (qf 0 ) > Rj  (qf 00 ) for every possible q.
Then, EUj(q) is decreasing in q for every possible q  n2 +1 and j prefers the simple
majority whatever the favorable signal.
Case 1f.b. If Rj 2 (1;+1), there are four main subcases.
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For su¢ ciently low Rj, it is 0 > Rj  (n2 + 1jf
0
) > Rj  (n2 + 1jf
00
) and the
same result of case 1f.a applies.
For higher Rj, it is Rj   (n2 + 1jf
0
) > 0 > Rj   (n2 + 1jf
00
). By Remark
3, the higher the threshold q, the lower the di¤erence Rj   (qf ). Hence, it is
Rj (qf 0 ) > 0 > Rj (qf 00 ) for su¢ ciently low q and 0 > Rj (qf 0 ) > Rj (qf 00 )
for higher q. Hence, EUj(qf 0 ) is increasing in q for su¢ ciently low q and decreasing
otherwise; EUj(qf 00 ) is decreasing in q for every q  n2 + 1. This means that j
prefers a (internal) supermajority for f = f
0
and the simple majority for f = f
00
, i.e.
n+ 1 > q
f 0 > q

f 00 =
n
2
+ 1.
For even higher Rj, it is Rj  (qf 0 ) > Rj  (qf 00 ) > 0 for su¢ ciently low q and
Rj   (qf 0 ) > 0 > Rj   (qf 00 ) for higher q. Then, for f = f 0, j prefers a higher
supermajority (eventually, unanimity) than for f = f
00
, i.e. n+1  q
f 0 > q

f 00 >
n
2
+1.
For extremely high Rj, it is qf = n+ 1, regardless of the favorable signal.
Case 1u (unfavorable). The two signals are unfavorable, i.e. f 0 < f 00 <
f
2
+ 1.
Case 1u.a. If Rj 2 (0; 1], there are three main subcases.
For su¢ ciently low Rj, it is 0 > Rj   (qf 0 ) > Rj   (qf 00 ) for low q and
Rj  (qf 0 ) > 0 > Rj  (qf 00 ) for high q. Hence: EUj(qf 0 ) is decreasing for low q
and increasing for high q (i.e. EUj(qf 0 ) is convex in q) and the preferred threshold
is either the simple majority or unanimity, i.e. q
f 0 2 fn2 + 1; n + 1g; EUj(qf 00 ) is
decreasing in q for every q  n
2
+ 1 and the preferred threshold is simple majority,
i.e. q
f 00 =
n
2
+ 1.
For higher Rj, it is Rj  (qf 0 ) > 0 > Rj  (qf 00 ) for low q and Rj  (qf 0 ) >
Rj  (qf 00 ) > 0 for high q. Hence: EUj(qf 0 ) is increasing in q for every q  n2 + 1
and the preferred threshold is unanimity, i.e. q
f 0 =
n
2
+ 1; EUj(qf 00 ) is decreasing
for low q and increasing for high q (i.e. EUj(qf 00 ) is convex in q) and the preferred
threshold is either the simple majority or unanimity, i.e. q
f 00 2 fn2 + 1; n+ 1g.
For even higher Rj, it is Rj   (n + 1jf 0) > Rj   (n + 1jf 00) > 0, hence the
preferred threshold is unanimity whatever the unfavorable signal, i.e. q
f 0 = q

f 00 =
n+ 1.
Case 1u.b. If Rj 2 (1;+1), it is Rj   (qf 0 ) > Rj   (qf 00 ) > 0 for every
threshold q. Then, EUj(q) is increasing in q for every possible q  n2 + 1 and j
prefers unanimity whatever the unfavorable signal.
Case 1uf. One signal is unfavorable (f 0) and the other is favorable (f 00), i.e.
f
0
<
f
2
+ 1  f 00.
By combining the results of case 1f and case 1u, one can easily get that qf is
increasing in Rj also in this case and that, given Rj, it is always qf 0  qf 00 .
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Recalling that Rj is positively related to js degree of risk aversion, Lemma 1 can
be extended in the following way.
Lemma 4 In the INFO treatment, the preferred majority threshold of an unbiased
agent depends positively on her degree of risk aversion and negatively on the numbers
of favorable votes in the private signal.
Extension of Case 2 in the main text. Suppose that the agent is over-condent
with respect to the private signal she receives. Hence (see Denition 1 in the main
text), p > ff .
If the signal is favorable, then p > ff > 0:5. Then, results of case 1f about the
role of Rj and f on qf apply a fortiori. Moreover, since (qf ) is increasing in p,
then, given Rj and f , Rj   (qf ) is lower for an over-condent agent than for an
unbiased one. This leads to a lower qf for the over-condent agent.
If the signal is unfavorable, then p > ff , with
f
f
< 0:5. Hence, p can be greater
than, equal to, or smaller than 0:5. Regardless of p, results of case 1u about the role
of Rj and f on qf still apply. Furthermore, if p < 0:5, by replicating the analysis
of case 1u and since, for given Rj and f , (qf ) is increasing in p, an over-condent
agent selects a lower qf than an unbiased one. If p  0:5, the rst-order di¤erence
of (qf ) with respect to q has the same sign of
p
1  p
2
  (q + 1  f)(n+ 1  q   f)
(q + 1  f + f)(n+ 1  q   f + f) ,
where both the rst and the second term are greater than 1. If p is su¢ ciently low,
(qf ) is decreasing in q, as occurs for the unbiased agent. Hence, by replicating
the analysis of case 1u and since, for given Rj and f , (qf ) is increasing in p, an
over-condent agent selects a lower qf than an unbiased one. If p is su¢ ciently high,
(qf ) is increasing in q and so, given Rj and f , Rj   (qf ) is lower for an over-
condent agent than for an unbiased one. Then, regardless of p, qf is lower for the
over-condent agent.
Therefore, Lemma 2 can be extended in the following way.
Lemma 5 In the INFO treatment, the preferred majority threshold of an over-
condent agent depends positively on her degree of risk aversion and negatively on
the number of favorable votes in the private signal. Moreover, for the same degree
of risk aversion and the same number of favorable votes in the private signal, an
over-condent agent prefers a lower majority threshold than the one preferred by an
unbiased agent.
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Extension of Case 3 in the main text. Suppose that the agent is uncondent
with respect to the private signal she receives. Hence (see Denition 1 in the main
text), p < ff .
If the signal is favorable, then p < ff , with
f
f
> 0:5. Hence, p can be greater than,
equal to, or smaller than 0:5. Regardless of p, results of case 1f about the role of Rj
and f on qf still apply. Furthermore, if p  0:5, by replicating the analysis of case 1f
and since, for given Rj and f , (qf ) is increasing in p, an uncondent agent selects
a higher qf than an unbiased one. If p < 0:5, the rst-order di¤erence of (qf ) with
respect to q has the same sign of
p
1  p
2
  (q + 1  f)(n+ 1  q   f)
(q + 1  f + f)(n+ 1  q   f + f) ,
where both the rst and the second term are smaller than 1. If p is su¢ ciently high,
(qf ) is increasing in q, as occurs for the unbiased agent. Hence, by replicating
the analysis of case 1f and since, for given Rj and f , (qf ) is increasing in p, an
uncondent agent selects a higher qf than an unbiased one. If p is su¢ ciently low,
(qf ) is decreasing in q and so, givenRj and f , Rj (qf ) is higher for an uncondent
agent than for an unbiased one. Then, regardless of p, qf is higher for the uncondent
agent.
If the signal is unfavorable, then p < ff < 0:5. Then, results of case 1u about
the role of Rj and f on qf apply a fortiori. Moreover, since (qf ) is increasing in
p, then, given Rj and f , Rj  (qf ) is higher for an uncondent agent than for an
unbiased one. This leads to a higher qf for the uncondent agent.
Therefore, Lemma 3 can be extended in the following way.
Lemma 6 In the INFO treatment, the preferred majority threshold of an uncondent
agent depends positively on her degree of risk aversion and negatively on the number
of favorable votes in the private signal. Moreover, for the same degree of risk aversion
and the same number of favorable votes in the private signal, an uncondent agent
prefers a higher majority threshold than the one preferred by an unbiased agent.
Considering together the three lemmas above, Proposition 1 can be extended in
the following way.
Proposition 2 In the voting lottery  of the INFO treatment, an agents preferred
majority threshold depends positively on her degree of risk aversion and negatively
on the number of favorable votes in the private signal and on her condence about
the private signal.
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Appendix C
Table C.1. Majority thresholds and Guesses of the number of unfavorable votes (# unf ).
NO-INFO INFO
Majority Threshold #unfq #unf<q p-value #unfq #unf<q p-value
(q=n) = 50% 0 8 0:000 3 6 0:157
(q=n) 2 (50%; 60%) 3 12 0:001 4 8 0:103
(q=n) 2 [60%; 70%) 0 9 0:000 1 14 0:000
(q=n) 2 [70%; 80%) 1 24 0:000 1 13 0:000
(q=n) 2 [80%; 90%) 0 20 0:000 1 10 0:000
(q=n) 2 [90%; 100%) 1 6 0:008 0 6 0:000
(q=n) = 100% 0 17 0:000 0 12 0:000
overall 5 88 0:000 7 63 0:000
Note. This table reports, for both the NO-INFO and the INFO treatment: the number of subjects
indicating in part 2 of the second phase a guess of the number of unfavorable votes (# unf ) higher than
or equal to the majority threshold chosen in part 1 of the second phase (q); all the remaining subjects;
results of a (two-tailed) proportion test for the null hypothesis of an equal distribution between the two
categories identied in the considered treatment.
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